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Abstract
EU trade policies and the environment in which they are determined are now considerably
different from when the EU came into being in the 1950s. With the exceptions of agriculture
and textiles and clothing, tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade in goods have been
reduced to historically very low levels. But trade policy is now about much more than border
restrictions upon trade in goods. Trade in services and the impact of national differences in
regulatory regimes are now firmly on the trade policy agenda. This paper describes the current
multilateral and preferential trade policies of the EU. It highlights the increasing importance
of regulatory issues and the fact that some of these are being addressed outside of both
multilateral and standard bilateral free trade agreements. This reflects the mixed motives
behind EU trade policies and that for trade with certain regions the typical political economy
factors framing trade policy are no longer relevant. For example, liberalisation of transatlantic
trade, in the limited form at present of mutual recognition of conformity assessment, is being
strongly driven by large corporate business. This trend suggests that the pyramid of
preferences usually used to depict EU trade policies is becoming very distorted.
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Introduction
EU trade policies and the environment in which they are applied have fundamentally changed
since the coming into being of the EEC in 1957. In the 1960s and 1970s external commercial
policy was focused upon tariffs and other border measures and trade in goods. This was a time
when the relevant political economy paradigm was one in which the interests of import-
competing firms were offset against those of export supplying firms when contemplating and
negotiating international agreements to liberalise external commercial policies
During this period the EU embraced both multilateral and bilateral liberalisation. The
common external tariff of the EU for industrial products has declined from an average of over
15 per cent in the early 1960s to around 3 per cent today. At the same time the EU became
notorious for establishing a pyramid of trade preferences with different groups of countries in
different tiers of market access. Thus, the level of formal trade protection in the EU is now
generally very low. There are some exceptions with high tariffs remaining in particular
sectors, primarily agriculture and textiles and clothing.
Commercial policy nowadays is much more diverse. It is no longer just policies affecting
trade in goods which are on the agenda. The policy environment affecting trade in services
and conditions influencing foreign direct investment have become increasingly important. In
addition, EU preferentialism in trade policy is no longer synonymous with regionalism as the
recent agreements with South Africa and Mexico demonstrate. As tariffs and quantitative
restrictions have declined in importance attention has turned much more to a whole range of
non-border policies, captured under the term of regulatory issues, which affect trade flows.
These include technical standards and regulations and rules on intellectual property rights.
The EU is addressing these issues at the multilateral level in the WTO, in regional trade
agreements and in bilateral agreements on specific regulatory issues, such as the mutual
recognition of testing and conformity assessment.
 The last four decades have also seen the rising importance of multinational firms and the
growth of intra-industry trade and substantial cross-boundary sourcing by large corporations.
This has led to a substantial change in the political economy environment in which thePAUL BRENTON
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European Union determines trade policy decisions.
1 The typical model remains relevant for
sectors such as agriculture and perhaps textiles and clothing which have largely been excluded
from the liberalisation of border measures. However, for modern sophisticated industrial
products, which now dominate EU import and exports, the main corporate players operate
large international networks and are both importers and exporters. The attention of large
corporate business has become concentrated upon removing differences in national regulatory
systems, such as technical regulations, which raise the costs of operating global production
systems. In general most of the effort at removing the barriers to market access caused by
these differences in regulatory systems has taken place at the regional and bilateral level.
The aim of this paper is to take stock of EU trade relations and trade policies in this new
environment. We outline the nature of both multilateral and bilateral trade policy
commitments in goods, and briefly in services. We then discuss in some detail bilateral
agreements on regulatory issues and concentrate upon issues relating to technical barriers to
trade and specifically the mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures. We
contend that, if as is most likely, such agreements have a significant effect on reducing the
costs of exporting between the two parties to the agreement, then they will be discriminatory.
Since the EU has concentrated upon such agreements with MFN partners this suggests that
the shape of the pyramid of preferences which is the standard analogy for EU trade policies is
becoming distorted.
The Geographical and Commodity Composition of EU Trade
We start by providing a quick and simple overview of the main changes in the nature of EU
trade over the past 30 to 40 years.  Figure 1 shows the geographical structure of total (internal
and external) EU imports of goods in three years: 1965, 1990 and 1998. In all three years we
present the structure of trade for the current 15 members of the EU. Thus, we look backwards
from the current EU membership and see how the geographical structure of this block has
changed over the past 35 years. The figure shows the share of the main continents, which in
trade policy practice are fairly synonymous with regional economic groupings or identities.
It is clear that the main growth in intra-European trade (including trade between what are now
EU members as well as trade with the Balkans states, Central and Eastern European
Countries, EFTA and EEA countries, Turkey and CIS countries) occurred prior to 1990. The
                                                       
1 Since the European Union does not have a legal personality, responsibility for external trade policy
for goods, the issue of services will be discussed later, remains with the European Communities.
However, for simplicity and to avoid confusion we will refer throughout to the European Union.THE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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share of all European countries in the imports of the current 15 EU members increased from
59 per cent in 1965 to 72 per cent in 1990. This rise in the share of imports from other
European countries occurred at the expense of falling shares for all other regions with the
exception of Asia. The share of North America, for example, declining from 14 per cent of the
total in 1965 to 8 per cent in 1990. The shares of both African and Central and South
American countries were halved during this period. In the 1990s however, the broad
geographical structure of EU imports has remained relatively constant. The key feature being
a slight decline in the share of EU15 imports coming from other European countries and an
increase in the importance of imports from Asia.
The picture for EU15 exports, shown in Figure 2, is very similar to that of imports: substantial
growth in intra-European trade between 1965 and 1990 and relative stagnation of the share of
such trade in the 1990s. The increase in the share of European countries in EU15 exports in
the 1970s and 1980s led to a relative substitution away from EU exports primarily to Africa
but also to North America and Central and South America. The share of Asia in EU15 exports
remained fairly constant. In the 1990s the importance of North America and Asia as a
destination for EU15 exports increased very slightly whilst the share of European countries in
the exports of the EU15 countries fell. The information on both export and import shares
suggest significant growth in the importance of European countries in the period before 1990
but little subsequent change. The major integration episodes of the 1990s, the Single Market
and the enlargement of the EU to fifteen member countries have not led to any intensification
of trade between the EU15 and European countries including intra-Union trade.
Figures 3 and 4 show the commodity composition of EU15 imports and exports in 1965 and
1998. Here the changes are more profound. In 1965 almost half of EU imports were of food
and basic materials whilst by 1998 the share of these products had more than halved with over
80 per cent of EU15 imports being of manufactured goods. The growth in the share of
manufactures being entirely concentrated upon finished manufactures. With regard to exports
the importance of food and basic materials has declined from 22 per cent in 1965 to 13 per
cent in 1998. Again the rise in the importance of manufactures is due entirely to the rising
share of finished manufactures. Thus, these figures reflect the well-known fact that EU trade
is increasingly of an intra-industry nature – the two-way exchange of finished manufactured
products. We now proceed to look at how EU trade policy has changed over the past decades
and briefly summarise the current state of multilateral and bilateral access to the EU market.PAUL BRENTON
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The Common External Trade Policy of the EU
Tariffs, Quantitative Restrictions and Anti-Dumping Measures
Tariffs
The Common Commercial Policy of the EU has been in a constant state of flux since its
inception in the 1960s. This reflects the series of trade liberalisations negotiated under the
GATT, the increasing number of preferential trade agreements and more recently the
implementation of a genuinely uniform policy across member states after the creation of the
Single Market in 1992. We start by discussing the common external tariff and quantitative
restrictions and then consider the evolving nature of EU preferentialism. We then move on to
discuss the increasing role of regulatory issues in EU trade policy and how these issues are
likely to become increasingly prominent as globalisation proceeds.
The EU position on trade and trade liberalisation is clear (Pelkmans (1997)). The Masstricht
Treaty (Art 3a) clearly defined the principle governing external trade policy as that “of an
open market economy with free competition”. More generally, the Treaty of Rome laid down
the objectives of external trade policy as “the harmonious development of world trade, the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs
barriers” (Art. 110). Thus, in general there is a bias in the Treaty towards trade liberalisation
and liberal trade. This has in turn been reflected by the active participation of the EU in the
various GATT rounds. The (weighted) average tariff for industrial products has fallen from
around 17 per cent in the late 1950s (Swann (1992)) to around 3 per cent after the Uruguay
Round commitments are fully implemented. Thus, since the inception of the EC the
importance of tariff protection has dramatically declined. There are, however, some important
sectoral exceptions to this general leaning towards open markets and trade liberalisation, most
notably in agriculture and also textiles and clothing.
Table 1 shows the current trade weighted average common external tariff for the EU for
industrial products. These averages are calculated using total 1997 trade values as weights and
so do not take account of preferences granted to particular suppliers. However, as shown by
Sapir (1998) over 70 per cent of imports enter the EU market at the MFN rate. We return to
this below in the section on EU preferential policies. According to these data the EU average
tariff for industrial products will fall to below four per cent in 2005.
2  The table also shows
                                                       
2 These averages do not include the effect of the Information Technology Agreement which will
abolish tariffs on IT products.THE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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that the proportion of trade entering at a zero tariff rate will increase from around 13 per cent
in 1997 to almost 30 per cent in 2005.
The table also shows the key remaining problem with regard to the EU tariff, that of tariff
peaks. Although the average industrial tariff is now relatively low, a significant proportion of
imports enter the EU at very high tariff rates. In 1997 almost 13 per cent of imports were
subject to a tariff in excess of 10 per cent. This was only partially addressed in the Uruguay
Round, as there will only be a modest reduction by 2005, to around 10 per cent, in the share
of EU imports subject to high tariffs. In the main this issue is concentrated upon clothing
products where more than 90 per cent of imports in 2005 will still be subject to tariffs in
excess of 10 per cent.  The implication of this is that developing countries, who, in general,
tend to specialise in the production of labour-intensive products such as clothing products, on
average face higher tariff barriers in entering the EU market than OECD countries. This is
compounded by the very high trade barriers to the EU market for agricultural products.
The EU does offer the developing countries preferential access in the form of the GSP.
However, for products such as textiles and clothing, which are defined as ‘very sensitive’ the
duty reduction from the MFN rate is only 15 per cent. In addition administrative rules ensure
that only a fraction of imports from developing countries actually benefit from GSP treatment.
Sapir (1998) reports that 79 per cent of dutiable imports from GSP beneficiaries in 1994
qualified for preferential access to the EU market, yet only 38 per cent actually entered the
EU market with a duty less than the MFN rate. The reasons for this difference being the
effects of rules of origin which specify the requirements for products to be treated as
‘originating’ and therefore subject to GSP treatment, and tariff-quotas for particular products,
which set limits on the amount of imports which can receive beneficial access to the EU
market.
Thus, even with GSP treatment developing countries face relatively high tariff barriers
compared with developed countries. Table 2 shows that the average tariff for industrial
products for US exporters to the EU was 3.5 per cent in 1997 and this will fall to 2.5 per cent
in 2005. Table 3, on the other hand, shows that China, a GSP beneficiary faced an average
tariff on industrial products in 1997 of 6.4 per cent, which will only fall to 5.3 per cent in
2005.  Other examples are also informative. Moldova, a country in transition with average
GDP per head of around $500 per annum, on average faces a considerably higher tariff on its
exports to the EU than it levies on its imports from the EU. In other words EU producers, inPAUL BRENTON
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general face lower tariff barriers in exporting to the Moldovan market than do Moldovan
exporters when seeking to sell in the EU market.
3
 The major achievement of the Uruguay Round in relation to agriculture was to increase
transparency in the application of border policies and to obtain commitments on the level of
domestic and export subsidies. With regard to border policies the main commitment was the
tariffication of the range of non-tariff and variable levies that were previously used to protect
EU agriculture and a reduction in the average level of the tariff. Between 1995 and 1997 the
simple average EU tariff for agricultural products declined by 25 per cent to reach a figure of
almost 21 per cent in 1997.
4 However, these commitments appear to have done little to
improve overall access to the EU market. Between 1995 and 1998 the volume of EU
agricultural imports (HS 0-21) from non-member countries fell by over 6 per cent and the
share of the volume of extra-EU imports in total EU imports (extra + intra) declined from 38.6
to 35.1 per cent (Brenton and Nunez-Ferrer (2000)).
 The EU tariff schedule for agricultural products is still dominated by tariff peaks for products
such as meats, cereals and milk products. For example, in 1997 the simple average tariff
(taking account of the ad valorem equivalents of specific duties) for fresh meat of bovine
animals was 107.5 per cent with a narrow range from 94 to 125 per cent. For wheat the simple
average tariff in 1997 was almost 77 per cent whilst for milk and cream the simple average
was 59 per cent with a maximum tariff of 134 per cent (WTO (1997)). The Uruguay
Agreement on Agriculture has made transparent these very high levels of border protection
for certain agricultural products. Progress in making further reductions of these tariff rates is





 Quantitative Trade Restrictions
                                                       
3 In 1997 the average tariff on Moldovan exports to the EU was around 9 per cent (around 7 per cent
with full GSP benefits but in 1997 only one third of Moldovan exports to the EU which were entitled
to preferences actually received them) whilst the average tariff on EU exports to Moldova was just
over 4 per cent (Brenton (1999)).
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 Non-tariff border measures have substantially declined in importance in EU external trade
policy. The principal non-tariff measures imposed by the EU and EU member states in the
past have been quantitative import restrictions and voluntary export restraints (VERs). Anti-
dumping measures are separately discussed below. The past decade has seen a clear tendency
towards the decreasing use of quantitative trade measures. Having significantly reduced tariff
protection during the 1970s and 1980s the EU has now substantially alleviated the incidence
of quantitative trade restrictions. In 1988 almost 11 per cent of EU imports were covered by
core non-tariff measures (primarily quantitative restrictions and VERs). By 1996 this
coverage ratio had fallen to just over 4 per cent.
5
 Two factors lie behind the declining use by the EU of quantitative trade restrictions: the
Uruguay Round agreements and the completion of the Single Market. Under the Uruguay
Round the use of voluntary export restraints was prohibited. In addition, the Agreement on
Agriculture led to the tariffication of non-tariff measures. As noted above, however, this did
not necessarily improve market access, since some quantitative restrictions and variable price
levies where tariffied at very high and probably prohibitive levels. The Uruguay Round also
addressed the other main sector where quantitative restrictions are prevalent: textiles and
clothing. The industrial countries agreed to phase out the multi-fibre agreement (MFA), which
together with its predecessors has controlled imports from developing countries for over 40
years since the comically titled Short-Term Agreement. The Uruguay Round agreement
stipulated that bilateral quotas should be liberalised over a 10 year period from the creation of
the WTO in 1995. However, under the terms of the agreement the industrial countries have
been able to backload liberalisation of the most binding quotas for the most sensitive products
until the final date at the end of 2004.
 The fact that the most sensitive items will be liberalised at the final moment has led some
commentators to suggest that in the face of substantial domestic pressures quotas will be
prolonged or that a raft of safeguard measures will be introduced. This seems to be a realistic
concern in the US, but in Europe the clamour for continued protection has not been heard. EU
industry, following substantial outsourcing, appears resigned to the death of the MFA and is
devoting its efforts to opening export markets in the developing countries whose quota access
to the EU will be liberalised.
                                                       
5 These figures and subsequent data in this section are taken from Auboin and Laird (1999).PAUL BRENTON
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 The EU countries adopted a common external tariff in the 1960s, as is fundamental in a
customs union. However, the individual member states maintained their battery of national
quotas for textiles and clothing products. In the 1970s the product scope of these restrictions
was widened under the MFA and quantitative limits were based upon VERs negotiated at the
EU level but then distributed on a national basis. Thus, for textiles and clothing the EU
effectively became a free trade area with national volume protection (Pelkmans (1997)).
Throughout the 1970s the scope of national volume protection increased to cover cars,
footwear, bags, umbrellas, steel, televisions and a range of other products.
 National volume protection requires the partitioning of national markets via border controls to
prevent trade deflection (imports entering highly constrained markets via more liberal
neighbours). Although this is inconsistent with the maintenance of a common commercial
policy, which was required by the Treaty of Rome, and the freedom of movement of goods,
national volume restrictions were never challenged by the Commission. It was not until the
Single Market programme which started in the late 1980s and necessitated the removal of
border controls between member countries that national volume restrictions were removed
and a genuinely common external policy for trade in goods was finally established at the
beginning of 1993. All trade restrictions maintained individually by member states were
removed and were, in general, not substituted by EU wide restrictions. The exceptions are
textiles and clothing products, where quotas will be fully liberalised by 2005, certain footwear
products and Japanese cars, where the restrictions have subsequently lapsed, and bananas and
steel products.
 EU trade policy regarding bananas is rather unique in that external trade restrictions are not
driven by the consideration of protecting domestic producers
6 but rather by developmental
policy towards African and Caribbean producers. EU policy has been subject to a series of
complaints at the WTO and is currently being reformed towards a tariff only system. There
has been a massive reduction in the number of quotas and VERs in the steel sector. The
number of tariff lines in the steel sector subject to non-tariff measures fell from 37 per cent in
1988 to less than one per cent in 1996. There remain a number of restrictions on imports from
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
                                                       
6 Apart from small-scale production in the Canary Islands there is no domestic output of bananas in the
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 Thus, although the incidence of non-tariff measures increased significantly in the 1970s, the
late 1980s and 1990s have seen an annihilation of national quantitative restrictions and VERs
in Europe following the Uruguay Round and the completion of the Single Market. After the
phase out of the MFA and the removal of remaining steel quotas, quantitative restrictions will
effectively be a trade measure of the past in Europe.
 Anti-dumping Measures
 The main trade defence, or contingent protection, instrument used by the EU is anti-dumping
measures. Safeguard measures and countervailing duties are not of significance. The use of
anti-dumping measures by the EU increased rapidly in the 1980s but the number of measures
in force has subsequently stabilised. In 1990 there were 139 anti-dumping measures, there
was a slight increase to around 150 measures in 1993 and 1994 but a subsequent fall to 141
and 142 measures in force in 1997 and 1998 respectively.
 The products most often involved in these anti-dumping cases are mineral products and
chemicals (primarily organic chemicals), textile products and machinery and equipment,
mainly electrical machinery and equipment.  Other products affected range from metals and
steel products, to footwear, handbags and bicycles. Asian countries are most subjected to anti-
dumping measures. In 1998, of the 142 measures in place, 92 (67 per cent) concerned Asian
countries. There were only three cases against African countries, five against Central and
South American countries and three cases involving North America. Most of the remaining 39
cases applied to Central and Eastern European countries and countries of the former Soviet
Union. A very large proportion of EU cases involve countries in transition. In 1998 about one
half of the cases where definitive duties were applied involved China and the members of the
former Comecon (Central and Eastern European Counties and the former Soviet Union) bloc.
 Where anti-dumping measures (ad valorem duties, specific duties, minimum prices, or price
undertakings) are applied the average duty tends to be very high. Brenton (2000) calculates
for a sample of cases from 1988 to 1995 an average duty (including ad valorem equivalents of
specific duties) in excess of 25 per cent. Thus, anti-dumping measures are likely to have a
major impact upon trade in the products covered. The average duty is considerably higher
than the level of tariff protection affecting most products, with the exception of agricultural
goods and products such as tobacco and alcoholic drinks. As noted above, the average tariff
for industrial products entering the EU is now around 3 per cent. However, anti-dumping
actions are by definition discriminatory. Imports from targeted countries are not onlyPAUL BRENTON
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discriminated against relative to domestic producers in the EU but also relative to non-named
extra-EU countries. Brenton (2000) and Messerlin (1989) show that EU anti-dumping policies
cause trade diversion and that this accrues primarily to non-EU suppliers. Prusa (1997) has
found similar results for the US.
Anti-dumping policies are now very well entrenched as a part of EU external trade policy.
Around 250 personnel are employed in the European Commission to solely deal with anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy (of which there are very few) investigations. However, they remain
subject to an extreme amount of criticism and continued suspicion that rather than a precise
and careful application of well-specified rules, they are simply a protectionist device.
Finally, it is a misapprehension to expect that a free trade agreement with the EU would have
a significant impact upon the use of anti-dumping measures by the EU. Specific undertakings
regarding anti-dumping and safeguard measures have never formally been included in
preferential agreements by the EU except for the EEA. The option of precluding anti-dumping
measures in the future has been included in the EU-Turkish customs union. The Europe
Agreements between the EU and the CEECs specify that before implementing antidumping
measures the EU must provide the Association Council with all the relevant information with
a view to finding a solution acceptable to both sides. However, after changing from the initial
treatment of the CEECs as “state trading” to “market economies” the number of EU anti-
dumping investigations increased despite this process of prior consultation. The Europe
Agreements contain no provisions for the phasing out of anti-dumping policies or the threat of
their use. The Essen Council of December 1994 gave an undertaking that ‘as satisfactory
implementation of competition policy and control of state aids together with the application of
those parts of Community law linked to the internal market are achieved, so the Union should be
ready to consider refraining from using commercial defence instruments for industrial products’.
The key issue, which has not been elucidated by the Council or Commission, is what constitutes
‘satisfactory implementation’ and under what conditions the Community would consider
refraining from using contingent protection. In practice, anti-dumping measures will only be
proscribed once these countries accede to the EU.
EU Preferentialism
A key feature of EU commercial policy has been that on the one hand the EU has been a keen
proponent of multilateral liberalisation and the construction of an effective body of world
trade law whilst on the other hand the EU has been at the forefront of discrimination in worldTHE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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trade in the form of the proliferating number of preferential trade agreements that it has
signed. There have been two waves to this preferentialism with perhaps a third wave
emerging at the start of this new decade.
The EU was at the heart of the first wave of post-war preferential trade agreements in the
1960s and 1970s.  The formation of the European and Steel Community in 1951 and then the
European Economic Community in 1957 contributed to a series of attempts to emulate
customs unions among less developed countries in the 1960s. Economic integration amongst
the initial six members led directly to a response in Europe from non-participating countries
in the form of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) formed in 1960.
The EU was also pre-eminent in the subsequent spread of preferentialism, concluding
association agreements with Turkey and Greece and the Yaoundé Agreements (and then the
Lomé Treaties) providing, non-reciprocal often duty free access to former colonies in the
1960s. Bilateral free trade areas in industrial goods were introduced with the six EFTA
countries and a series of preferential, non-reciprocal agreements were signed with
Mediterranean countries in the 1970s. These agreements together with the implementation of
the EC’s Generalised System of Preferences in the early 1970s started the construction of the
EU’s infamous pyramid of preferences. We shall discuss how the pyramid has evolved in
more detail below and will argue that as the range of trade related policy issues included in
bilateral agreements has expanded the shape of the pyramid has become more complicated.
The second wave of EU preferentialism started to evolve in the late 1980s. As with the first
wave, the preferential agreements were synonymous with regionalism. The only exceptions
being the Lomé conventions and the GSP, which were primarily developmental in focus, with
the former also reflecting historical legacies. This wave has been characterised both by a
proliferation of new trade agreements as well as the extension and enhancement of existing
bilateral relationships. On the one hand, the deepening of integration between EU members in
the form of the programme to create the Single Market, led to a reformulation of the
relationships between the EU and the EFTA countries in the form of the European Economic
Area (EEA) and ultimately to the accession of three of the EFTA countries. The increasing
number of agreements came first from the end of the division of Europe. The EU
implemented free trade agreements with each of the 10 countries in central and Eastern
Europe (CEECs) who have subsequently requested membership of the EU. EFTA quickly
followed with its own agreements with these countries and mutual trade between a group ofPAUL BRENTON
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the CEECs was liberalised under the CEFTA. In addition, the EU sought to enhance and re-
invigorate existing trade agreements with Mediterranean countries. In part this reflected the
perceived need to give attention to the Southern borders of the EU.
This second wave of EU preferentialism in fact followed a bout of regionalism elsewhere in
the world, although it is generally felt that the actions of the EU indirectly contributed to the
initiation of regional schemes in the Americas. The EU’s fixation on creating the Single
Market in the mid and late 1980s led to the perception that the EU was relatively uninterested
in multilateralism which in turn pushed the US to seek strategic regional deals first with
Canada and then with Mexico in the NAFTA (Pelkmans and Brenton (1999)).
Figure 5 shows the current state of EU preferentialism in the form of the, typically referred to,
pyramid. The figure shows the composition of the various tiers which represent different
degrees of preferential access to the EU market together with the share of external EU15
imports in 1965 and 1998 accounted by the various groups of countries. At the base are those
countries which have only MFN, non-preferential access to the EU market. Although the
number of these countries is small, six, they account for a very large proportion of EU
external imports, 36 per cent in 1998. It is interesting to note that the size of the base has
remained unchanged since the 1960s. In 1965 these countries accounted for exactly 36 per
cent of extra-EU imports for the 15 member countries. However, there has been some
substitution between members of the MFN group. The share of the two North American
countries has fallen from almost 29 per cent of the total to around 23 per cent whilst the
combined share of Australia and New Zealand has fallen from 5 per cent to less than 1.5 per
cent. On the other hand the share of the two Asian MFN countries has risen from 2 to almost
12 per cent.
Next in the hierarchy come non-reciprocal preference schemes. As noted above the extent to
which these agreements translate into actual preferential market access is limited by often
complex origin rules, tariff quotas and quantitative restrictions. For example, in the EU
agreement with Albania the EU offers exemption from customs duties and quantitative
restrictions subject to a series of product specific annexes. Although the annexes in the
Albania agreement cover only 5 per cent of the tariff lines they cover 62 per cent of AlbanianTHE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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exports to the EU (TDI (2000)). These annexes typically set quantitative ceilings after which
duties are imposed.
7
Similarly around 60 of imports from the GSP countries pay the MFN duty. Figure 5 shows
that in 1998 imports from the GSP beneficiaries accounted for around 30 per cent of external
EU imports. Hence the MFN base of the pyramid is very broad. In this tier we have also
included African and Caribbean countries who are party to the Lomè Convention. This
agreement has primarily entailed non-reciprocal market opening by the EU. The new Lomè
Agreement negotiated in 2000 extends this for a further period of eight years. However, after
September 2002 the EU will initiate negotiations on reciprocal economic partnerships, with
the aim of concluding such agreements by the end of 2007.
Within the GSP group the EU has made vague commitments to consider free trade
agreements with the European CIS countries (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) and with
MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market. The EU has been
negotiating for many years a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Currently the process is blocked by the EU’s insistence that the GCC members first form a
customs union.
Next in the hierarchy of preferences comes a group of free trade agreements with non-
European countries. With the exception of the agreement with Israel, all of these agreements
are new (Mexico, South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia) or under negotiation (other MEDs) and all
of these countries have climbed up from the non-reciprocal tier. Above this tier comes a group
of free trade agreements with European countries characterised by much deeper integration in
terms of regulatory reform, an issue to which we return in detail below. The agreements with
the EEA countries and Switzerland are long-standing and have been subject to substantial
evolution. The Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European countries are more
recent (negotiated in the early 1990s). All of the agreements in this group are with countries
who are potential members of the EU.
The discussion suggests that a third wave of EU preferentialism has perhaps become apparent
in the 1990s in the form of preferential agreements which do not have a regional identity. It
should also be noted that recent agreements have been implemented with countries having
substantially different levels of income and development than the EU. This trend will
                                                       
7 The EU has recently (COM (2000) 351) revised its commercial policy approach to the Balkans and
reduced the number of tariff ceilings. Nevertheless, only limited duty free access remains for textilePAUL BRENTON
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continue if progress is made in adopting the range of prospective agreements that have been
raised by the EU. The EU has recently signed free trade agreements with South Africa and
most recently Mexico. The free trade agreement with Mexico is clearly linked to the NAFTA.
However, neither agreement has been driven by pressing border-related foreign policy
concerns, as was the case with the Europe Agreements and the MEDs.
Potential EU membership has always been a defining characteristic of the depth and often
breadth of EU agreements. Being European is a pre-requisite for EU membership. However,
the scope for additional trade agreements in Europe is now limited. The ten countries in
Central and Eastern Europe have extensive free trade agreements and are in the process of the
comprehensive adoption of all EU rules and regulations as part of the process of their
accession to the EU. Turkey, too, is now seriously considered as a future EU member. That
leaves the Balkans and the European CIS countries. These countries form a major challenge to
EU foreign and commercial policy in the next decade to which we return below.
How far will this third wave extend? Sapir (1998) and Pelkmans and Brenton (1999) discuss
why countries seek free trade agreements with the EU and the reasons why the EU is
interested in negotiating such agreements. Both stress the mixed motives behind the EU’s
approach to bilateral free trade agreements. The main factors seem to be
• Foreign policy issues: ‘trade policy has always been the principal instrument of foreign
policy for the EU’ (Sapir (1998) p726). The pattern of preferential trade agreements of the
EU reflects the differing geo-political interests of the individual member states. In
addition, the EU has always used free trade agreements as an essential element towards
providing regional stability on the borders of the EU.
• Commercial Diplomacy: to improve market access for EU suppliers in third country
markets
• Development policy issues: Lomé, the first generation of MED agreements and the GSP
reflect development concerns. The use of trade policies to try and achieve development
objectives is particularly apparent in the high profile case of bananas.
Within each of these broad categories a range of economic and political issues are
represented. An important issue is that as the EU grew in economic size and political
importance is began to act as an active economic hegemon. It has combined a liberal approach
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to multilateral trade liberalisation with a far-reaching concessionary approach to
preferentialism in its expanding sphere of influence. The latter is used in a way which seeks to
strengthen domestic reforms in the partner and promote multilateral liberalisation. Access to
the EU market, financial aid, economic cooperation and infrastructural links are used to
ensure compliance and preclude free riding (which was initially tolerated from the MEDs,
Turkey and the African and Caribbean signatories to the Lomé treaty). This economic
hegemony can be politically sensitive when the hegemonic power refuses to make significant
concessions in policy areas of high importance for partners (agriculture, for example).
This problem arises when considering the potential for the third wave of EU preferentialism,
that is with countries where issues of regional stability are not paramount. The difficulty that
the EU faces in extending its network of free trade agreements to other countries is WTO
rules and the CAP. Article XXIV of the GATT demands that free trade agreements cover
‘substantially all’ trade between the partners.  This is now generally accepted within the
Commission as meaning that any agreement must cover at least 90 to 95 per cent of trade.
8
This coupled with the absolute resistance within the EU to the liberalisation of trade in
sensitive agricultural products (grains, beef, milk, diary products, sugar) makes it difficult to
see how agreements could be concluded with countries in say Mercosur or in the Andean
pact. Table 4 shows that the share of agricultural products in these countries exports to the EU
are substantial, around 60 per cent in the case of Mercosur and almost 75 per cent for the
Andean countries. The share of agriculture in EU imports from partners with recently
concluded free trade agreements is much lower. Only 32 per cent of South African exports to
the EU in 1998 were of agricultural products, whilst in the same year around 28 per cent of
Mexican exports were of agricultural products.
9
Currently free trade negotiations on agricultural products proceed on a detailed product by
product basis. This ensures a minimal amount of market opening in the EU since special
interests are able to influence the negotiations at a very detailed level with little scope for
trade-offs. It also reflects the hegemonic power of the EU and the way that the EU currently
wields that influence.
                                                       
8 Note that this does not mean that 95 per cent of all tariff lines must be covered. It is 95 per cent of
tariff distorted trade which is measured. Thus, products subject to prohibitive tariffs tend not to be
liberalised.
9 This did not prevent some bitter haggling in the South African case over the use specific names for
certain alcoholic beverages.PAUL BRENTON
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Note that EU bilateral trade agreements are now fundamentally different from those of the
1950s and 60s. The EU is now actively pushing for the end of non-reciprocity in its
agreements with the ACP countries and the Mediterranean countries. In the past the EU
tended to conclude reciprocal agreements only with potential members of the EU. This
reflects the opposition at the time of the US to the expansion of preferential trade agreements.
Indeed, Sapir (1998) documents that the original plan for trade preferences with the ACP
countries was for reciprocal arrangements but in the face of US objections this was abandoned
and a non-reciprocal system was implemented. This has now changed of course by the
participation of the US itself in preferential trade schemes. It is interesting to note from the
data on the shares of EU15 imports in 1965 and 1998 (in Figure 5) that the countries and
country groupings which have been in the non-reciprocal tiers (Mexico, South Africa, MEDs,
Lomè, Balkans, GSP) have all lost market share. This non-reciprocal group of countries as a
whole provided 51 per cent of EU15 external imports in 1965 but only 40 per cent in 1998.
Countries which have implemented agreements requiring mutual abolition of trade barriers
have increased their share of EU imports. However, some of this increase is due to the Central
and Eastern European countries whose trade with the EU prior to the 1990s was suppressed
under the previous regime but which quickly achieved the levels of trade associated with
‘normal’ market economies by the mid 1990s (Brenton and Gros (1997)).
In addition trade agreements are now about much more than trade policies. A key feature of
recent agreements is that they go far beyond the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions
and cover a whole range of regulatory issues relating to technical regulations and standards,
rights of establishment, competition policy and state aids, and trade in services. Attention to
these issues has been termed as deep integration (Lawrence (1996)), to which we now turn. It
is somewhat ironic that as formal trade barriers have declined the demand for trade
agreements with the EU has increased. As shown above, with the exception of agricultural
products, which are in part or in the main excluded from liberalisation under EU agreements,
EU tariffs are generally quite low. Thus, the desire for free trade agreements with the EU is
now stimulated by much more than just the removal of tariff restrictions.
The inclusion of the new issues is asserted to be non-preferential and therefore not subject to
the rules of Article XXIV of the GATT. However, a number of authors are now beginning to
actively question this assumption (see, Baldwin (2000), for example). In a number of cases
the EU, as in the mutual recognition agreement with the US, has signed agreements on
regulatory issues outside of formal free trade agreements. We shall argue below that theseTHE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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types of agreement cover a significant proportion of trade from MFN partners and if, as there
are grounds to suspect, these agreements provide preferential access for the products covered
then the structure of the pyramid of trade preferences is becoming distorted. Thus, for
example, countries towards the top of the pyramid, such as Mediterranean countries and the
CEECs, do not face tariff barriers on their exports of industrial products. However, domestic
firms in these countries face the costs of achieving conformity assessment to technical
standards in both the home market and in the EU. On the other hand, for certain products, US
exporters have to pay the MFN tariff to access the EU market but may avoid some costs of
exporting since testing to EU standards carried out in US laboratories can be accepted as
conformity assessment in the EU. If the cost reduction from avoiding duplicity of conformity
assessment exceeds the magnitude of the external tariff for a particular product, then US
exporters may have the most preferred access to the EU market.
Current Trends in EU trade Policies: Deep Integration
The current environment in which EU trade policies are set is considerably different from that
of 40 years ago when the EU’s common trade policies were being established. Today tariffs
and quantitative trade restrictions are substantially lower and less prevalent. However, it has
been increasingly recognised that considerable problems still face firms wishing to trade and
invest abroad. These barriers arise from differences in the regulatory regimes imposed in
various countries, which act to segment markets along national lines, constraining the ability
of firms to effectively compete across national boundaries. The market segmenting effects of
these policies may not necessarily be intentional. For example, conformity with health, safety
and technical standards requires testing and certification, which will normally be required of
both domestic and imported products. But if every country maintains its own standards and
testing procedures then exported products will face a multiplicity of conformity assessment
and hence higher compliance costs and this will tend to reduce international trade flows.
At the same time, and in part due to the reduction in traditional trade barriers, the world
economy has become more integrated. This has been reflected in rising volumes of trade and
investment flows and increasing international interdependencies between firms. The activities
of multinational firms are now much more important and this is altering the political economy
which envelops trade policy making. A large proportion of trade is now intra-firm trade, that
is trade which takes place within multinational enterprises. Over 40 per cent of trade between
the US and the EU is intra-firm trade (Clausing (2000)). More generally, there has been anPAUL BRENTON
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increase in the extent to which firms outsource parts of the production process to overseas
suppliers leading to a ‘sequential, vertical trading chain stretching across many countries’
Hummels et al (1999).
A number of important implications for trade policy follow from this environment, the key
issues being:
• Further trade liberalisation is strongly supported by large corporations, that is
multinational firms and firms which both import and export. The traditional political
economy model where pro-protection import-competing firms vie with pro-liberalisation
export firms in the political market for protection is now much less valid. As a result
political efforts become focused upon achieving liberalisation with countries and within
industries where firms are both exporting and import-competing, that is where intra-
industry trade is dominant (Baldwin (2000)).
• The emphasis of liberalisation will be upon eliminating differences in national regulations
which segment markets and make internationally integrated production costly.  Tariff
barriers are now relatively unimportant and, where significant, can be circumvented by
multinational firms through transfer pricing policies.
It is in this context that the leaders of large corporations have strongly supported recent
regional and bilateral trade initiatives in Europe (the creation of the Single Market), in North
America (NAFTA) and in Asia (APEC). The role of business in influencing deep integration
has been increasingly institutionalised, for example, in the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD) and in the Pacific Business Forum. Much of the initiative for, and the propulsion
behind, the EU-US agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment came from the
TABD, which is pushing for further liberalisation of market access barriers. Business leaders
are not ignoring the possibility of multilateral initiatives through the WTO. However, the
gradualist approach and the perceived inability of the WTO to keep abreast of actual
developments in the world market appears to be dampening business enthusiasm.
Deep integration can be defined as agreements by governments to reduce the market
segmenting effects of differences in national regulations by the coordination, harmonisation
or mutual recognition of national laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms.
10 We now
proceed to discuss the EU approach to regulatory barriers, looking first at internal
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liberalisation and then at EU external policies in this area. We concentrate upon technical
barriers to trade, which remain one of the most important causes of market segmentation and
which have been particularly important in recent EU bilateral trade policy initiatives.
Technical barriers to trade (TBT’s) can arise whenever a producer may have to alter his/her
product in order to comply with differing partner country requirements such as for health,
safety, environmental and consumer protection issues. These requirements can be imposed by
both governments (technical regulations) and non-governmental organisations (non-regulatory
barriers, standards). The legal character of technical regulations distinguishes them from non-
regulatory barriers or standards; namely, the latter are voluntary, not legally binding and arise
from the self-interest of producers or consumers involved, for example, to improve the
information in commercial transactions and ensure compatibility between products. The
former mainly relates to either technical specifications or testing and certification
requirements such that the product actually complies with the specifications to which it is
subjected (conformity assessment).
Technical regulations strike at the heart of business operations affecting business pre-
production, production, sales and marketing policies. The need to adapt product design, re-
organise production systems, and multiple testing and certification can entail a significant cost
(or technical trade barrier) for suppliers of exported goods to a particular country, the
magnitude of which differs across products. The removal of TBTs within the EU is a central
tenet of the Single Market since it is crucial for the provision of equal conditions of market
access throughout the whole of the European Economic Space.  The removal of such barriers
promotes trade and efficiency and serves to strengthen competition by undermining the
fragmentation of the EU market.
Previous analysis of the completion of the Single Market in the existing EU countries
suggests that the removal of technical barriers to trade may be of great significance. CEC
(1998) calculates that over 79 per cent of intra-EU trade may have been affected by technical
regulations in 1996. Similar calculations are shown in Table 4 for EU trade with a range of
countries in 1997. These data demonstrate that a large share of EU imports and exports are of
products which are subject to technical regulations in the EU.
Instruments for removing Technical Barriers to Trade
EU policy related to standards, testing and certification requirements is currently based upon
two approaches: enforcement of the Mutual Recognition Principle (MRP) and if this fails, thePAUL BRENTON
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harmonisation of technical standards in each member country. Each approach will now be
discussed in turn.
Mutual Recognition
The basic EU approach has been to promote the idea that products manufactured and tested in
accordance with a partner country’s regulations could offer equivalent levels of protection to
those provided by corresponding domestic rules and procedures. However, this often requires
accreditation of testing and certification bodies and a mutual recognition arrangement (MRA)
between bodies because member states often regulate for the same product risks in slightly
different ways (or in the same way but requiring duplication of conformity assessment).
‘Mutual Recognition’ tends to apply where products are new and specialised and it seems to
be relatively effective for equipment goods and consumer durables, but it encounters
difficulties where the product risk is high and consumers or users are directly exposed.
Harmonisation
Where ‘equivalence’ between levels of regulatory protection embodied in national regulations
cannot be assumed, the only viable way to remove the TBT in question is for the member
states to reach agreement on a common set of legally binding requirements. Subsequently, no
further legal impediments can prevent market access of complying products anywhere in the
EU market. EU legislation harmonising technical specifications has involved two distinct
approaches, the ‘old approach’ and the  ‘new approach’.
The old approach mainly applies to products by which the nature of the risk requires extensive
product-by-product or even component-by-component legislation (chemicals, motor vehicles,
pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs) and is carried out by means of detailed directives. In the main
achieving this type of harmonisation has been slow for two reasons. First of all, the process of
harmonisation became highly technical since it sought to meet the individual requirements of
each product category (including components). This resulted in extensive and drawn-out
consultations. Secondly, the adoption of old approach directives was based on unanimity in
the Council.  As a result the harmonisation process proceeded extremely slowly. Indeed the
approach was ineffective since new national regulations proliferated at a much faster rate than
the production of EU level directives on a limited set of products (Pelkmans (1987)).
It became increasingly recognised that there was a need to reduce the intervention of the
public authorities prior to a product being placed on the market. Moreover, the decision-
making procedure needed to be adapted in order to facilitate the adoption of technicalTHE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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harmonisation directives by a qualified majority in the Council. This has been done by the
adoption of the ‘new approach’ and applies to products, which have “similar characteristics”
and where there has been widespread divergence of technical regulations in EU countries.
What makes this approach ‘new’ is that it only indicates ‘essential requirements’ and leaves
greater freedom to manufacturers as to how to satisfy those requirements, dispensing with the
‘old’ type of exhaustively detailed directives.
The new approach directives provide for more flexibility than the detailed harmonisation
directives of the old approach, by using the support of the established standardisation bodies,
CEN, CENELEC and the national standard bodies. The standardisation work is achieved in a
more efficient way, is easier to update and involves greater participation from industry. A
further feature of the new approach is the use of market surveillance and the choice of
attestation methods that are available: by self-certification against the essential requirements,
by using generic standards or by using notified bodies for type approval and testing of
conformity of type.
At the multilateral level, the traditional GATT approach of reciprocal concessions is not
easily applied in the area of regulatory differences and deep integration. The WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade reiterates the principals of most favoured nation treatment and
of national treatment as being applicable to all aspect of standards and conformity assessment.
However, the agreement goes further in obliging governments to ensure that technical barriers
are not more trade restricting than necessary to achieve a legitimate objective, in committing
governments to harmonise national standards with international standards, in providing for
acceptance of equivalent testing procedures in third countries, and in providing a framework
for dispute settlement.  In practice, however, the issue of reciprocity of conformity assessment
procedures and acceptance of test results from other members has not received any significant
attention in the multilateral context.
Bilateral Agreements on Conformity Assessment
Harmonisation and mutual recognition have been actively pursued by the EU in external
bilateral agreements, not always in the context of a comprehensive trade agreement. Mutual
recognition is also one of the most important objectives on the agenda of APEC. Baldwin
(2000) distinguishes between negotiated harmonisation, hegemonic harmonisation and mutual
recognition. At the international level negotiated harmonisation is unlikely to be feasible.
Hegemonic harmonisation and mutual recognition are currently being employed by the EU inPAUL BRENTON
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bilateral agreements. Hegemonic harmonisation entails small countries and less-developed
countries adopting the regulations of the EU although there are substantial differences in
obligations between the various agreements that the EU has entered into. The EU has
followed the mutual recognition approach with countries such as the US, Canada and Japan.
For example, Article 51 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the
Ukraine and the EU contains a general commitment on the part of Ukraine to adopt the
acquis, or body of law, of the Community, such that  ‘Ukraine shall endeavour to ensure that
its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community’ (Article 51(1)).
A similar clause is present in the Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European
countries although the Central and Eastern European countries must use their ‘best
endeavours’ to ensure compatibility with Community legislation.
Elsewhere, the free trade agreement with Mexico contains little substance on regulatory issues
and in particular, on technical barriers to trade whilst the agreement with South Africa
includes a commitment to develop agreements on mutual recognition of conformity
assessment. The EU has no formal trade agreement with the US but it does have a mutual
recognition agreement for conformity assessment of specific products. Under a MRA each
country is given the authority to test and certify in its own territory, and prior to export, the
conformity of products with the other countries regulatory requirements.
The EU-US MRA agreement covers the following selected sectors: telecommunications
equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreation craft, pharmaceutical
good medical practices, and medical devices. Table 5 shows the share of these products in EU
imports from various countries in 1998. Thus, the MRA with the US covered almost 13 per
cent of EU imports from the US. The value of this trade exceeds the value of EU imports in
the top tier of the pyramid in Figure 5. Thus, if recognition by the EU of US conformity
assessment for the sectors covered significantly reduces the costs of exporting to the EU for
US firms then the pyramid of preferences will become rather distorted.
11
Mutual recognition agreements can be expected to bring a number of benefits. In particular,
the expense, time and unpredictability of obtaining approval can be reduced if the product can
be tested for conformity in the country of production. Unfortunately, at present we do not
have good estimates of the impact that the MRA will have on the costs of exporting. SurveyTHE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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evidence from OECD (2000) suggests that ‘mutual recognition agreements of conformity
assessment procedures have had a distinct and beneficial effect on the costs of compliance’.
There is also the argument that the amount of resources and effort dedicated by business in
pushing forward the agenda on mutual agreements strongly suggests that the benefits to firms
of such agreements are non-negligible. Thus, in the near future a substantial proportion of
trade from those countries in the bottom tier of the pyramid, all bar Taiwan have either
negotiated or are negotiating an MRA with the EU, could enter the EU market more easily
than goods from other countries in higher tiers.
Interestingly, a much smaller share of EU exports to the US comprises products covered by
the MRA; around 7 per cent in 1998. The table also shows that these products are also an
important part of the exports to the EU of a number of other countries. Over one sixth of
Taiwanese exports to the EU in 1998 were of products covered by the EU-US MRA. These
products also being important in the exports of Korea and Japan to the EU. Thus, if the MRA
has a significant impact on the costs of US exporters of these products it could have important
implications for the exports of other suppliers of the EU market.
The EU and the US have put forward the MRA as being consistent with WTO obligations.
This is true in the sense that the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade calls upon
members ‘to be willing to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of agreements for the
mutual recognition of results of each other’s conformity assessment procedures’. This appears
to grant MRAs an exception to the most favoured nation (MFN) obligation of the WTO.
Mathis (1998) argues that this exception could be challenged if a MRA imposes origin rules
which preclude the possibility of third-country goods to be accepted in one party to the MRA
after conformity assessment in the partner. However, given that given that MRAs reduce the
costs of market access to the signatories of the agreement but not for excluded countries, they
are preferential, violate the principle of non-discrimination which underlies the WTO and are
potentially trade diverting. MRAs which contain rules of origin merely exacerbate the degree
of discrimination.
12
                                                                                                                                                                            
11 The extent to which these cost reductions are actually realised will depend upon the way that the
MRA is implemented on both sides of the Atlantic. Initial impressions are that efforts regarding
implementation are negligible relative to the energy devoted to negotiation.
12 Origin rules are present in the EU-Switzerland MRA. Baldwin (2000) quotes sources suggesting that
the EU sought to have rules of origin in the MRA with the US. The US, however, resisted not on the
grounds of discrimination against other trading countries but on the grounds of the practicality of
identifying the country of origin for sophisticated industrial products.PAUL BRENTON
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The European Council has specified a list of priority countries with whom negotiations on
MRAs should be conducted. The list comprises the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, Philippines, China, South Africa, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand and Turkey. Recently, the EU has signed Protocols on European
Conformity Assessment with a number of Central and Eastern European countries as part of
the process of accession to the EU. Note that all South American countries and all bar one
African country are excluded from this list. In terms of the spirit of the GATT/WTO and the
principle of most favoured nation treatment it would seem appropriate that the EU not
preclude a MRA with any trading partner.  In fact the EU should be more open in stating that
any country which can demonstrate appropriate testing systems should be able the negotiate a
MRA with the EU. This could encourage companies which provide testing and conformity
assessment procedures in EU or other OECD countries to invest in countries which do not
have strong facilities in this field.
The Commission has raised the possibility that the range of bilateral MRAs that the EU may
shortly have could be made plurilateral. Indeed it has been suggested that EU bilateral MRAs
could be networked with those of other countries or trading blocs (APEC has made some
progress on conformity assessment) to create a plurilateral framework. However, this
enhances the danger that countries in Africa, Asia and South America, which are denied the
possibility of negotiating such agreements, will be increasingly marginalised.
The agenda of mutual recognition between the EU and the US is being pushed forward, under
the influence of the TABD. By the end of the year 2000 it is expected that two further
agreements will be signed on machine safety equipment and calibration. More generally,
these bilateral negotiations offer the scope for mutual recognition agreements on all products
covered by the New Approach in the EU as well as a number of Old Approach sectors.  Table
5 shows that if mutual recognition agreements were to be negotiated for all existing new
approach products then nearly 16 per cent of EU imports from, and 12 per cent of exports to,
the US would in total be affected.
At present integration between the EU and the US has been confined to the mutual
recognition of conformity assessment. There has been no attempt to move towards the mutual
recognition of regulations or towards harmonisation of regulations. However, the MRA may
be a stepping stone to more adventurous integration in the future. The forces pushing for
bilateral agreements on mutual recognition are in general are quite different to those whichTHE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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typically underlie free trade agreements negotiated by the EU, where, as we argued above, a
range factors including foreign policy considerations as well as economic implications are
important. A key feature of EU-US relations on this issue has been the dominant role played
by business and the lack of the typical political market for protection whereby the
Commission has to balance the interests of import-competing firms against those of exporters.
Baldwin (2000) suggests that the main losers from the liberalisation of technical barriers to
trade are small firms. The removal of factors which cause market fragmentation has a pro-
competitive effect that leads to the taking over, merging or exit from the market of the least
efficient, usually small, firms. The result is a market structure with fewer, larger more
efficient firms.
It is unlikely that large business will be content to stop at mutual recognition agreements. As
certain cost raising barriers are removed, such as the duplication of conformity assessment,
the impact of remaining technical barriers to trade will become even more apparent. As we
mentioned above the increasing importance of international production networks will lead to
ever greater demands for the removal of cost raising differences in national regulatory
regimes. Indeed, the Seville Declaration, which launched the TABD, states that the goal is to
‘ensure that laws and regulations converge wherever possible to allow market forces to
accelerate economic growth’. In addition, the increasing importance of multinational firms
and the greater role of business in influencing regulatory decisions suggest that there will be
forces pushing towards the informal international harmonisation of standards and regulatory
barriers. For example, the main industry players often make an important contribution to the
setting of standards. If these main players are the same on both sides of the Atlantic then there
will be a tendency towards common standards.
Trade In Services
Trade in services has increased in importance in recent years. The key services which are now
traded are travel and tourism, transportation services, financial services, including banking
and insurance, and professional services, such as accountancy and business consultancy. In
the EU around 50 per cent of total trade between members comprises services (Barth (1999)).
However, there remain severe restrictions on services trade. Internally, the EU has been much
less successful in removing barriers to trade in services than it has in creating a single market
for industrial goods. This is suggested by the fact that whilst the share of internal goods trade
increased from 28.4 to 31.5 per cent of Union GDP between 1992 and 1997 the share ofPAUL BRENTON
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traded services increased little over this period. Nevertheless, there are signs of increasing
integration from the amount of foreign direct investment in services activities within the
Union which has increased more rapidly than overseas investment in other activities (CEC
(1999)).
International service transactions can often be distinguished by the direct contact between
providers and consumers that needs to take place, although some services, such as
international telephone services, can be traded across borders in the same manner as trade in
goods. In many cases either the consumer must move to the place of production, as in tourism,
or the factors used to produce the service must be located in the country of consumption. The
latter can be undertaken through foreign investment to create an overseas commercial
presence, as is usually the case in the provision of financial services, or through the temporary
movement of workers, for example, in the provision of business services. Thus, liberalisation
of services requires not just the removal of barriers to cross-border flows of service products
but also the effective elimination of obstacles to foreign direct investment and the movement
of workers.
Current EU external trade policy with regard to services reflects both multilateral
commitments made under the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) and
provisions in bilateral trade agreements. The EU is, however, far from establishing a common
commercial trade policy for services. This reflects in part the desires of member states to
maintain a degree of national discretion in setting policy for certain services, for example, in
providing access to national airports to foreign airlines. It also encapsulates a continuing
evolution in the EU as to extent of the Unions competence to conclude international
agreements in services. The Union’s competence to conclude international agreements can
come from two sources
13: express provisions in the treaty, for example, Article 133 provides
for the Union to negotiate tariff agreements; and the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice. With regard to the latter the Court has ruled that other provisions of the Treaty and
measures adopted within those provisions may confer external competence. The existence of
“internal rules” bestows external competence to the Union. Hence there is a relationship
between the exercise of internal competence and that of external competence.
Although it is not disputed that the EU has exclusive competence for the Common
Commercial Policy, there is contention over the exact scope of the Common Commercial
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Policy. For trade in goods it is now clear, after the creation of the Single Market and the
removal of the national quantitative restrictions, that the EU has exclusive competence to
conclude international agreements and that because of the primacy of Union laws over
domestic law there is little scope for national policy discretion.
14  For trade in services the
situation is less clear. In the face of the increase in the number and range of issues on the
negotiating table under the Uruguay Round, the Court of Justice was asked to decide the
extent of the Common Commercial Policy. In the meantime a compromise was reached
between the Commission and the Member States on defining common positions. In effect the
Commission negotiated on behalf of all member states who then entered country specific
reservations on particular services and market access issues. With regard to services, the
Court, consistent with the GATS, identified four modes of supply, cross-border supply,
consumption, commercial presence and movement of persons, and concluded that the
Common Commercial Policy applies only to the first method.
The Court did rule that existing “internal rules” with regard to transport and intellectual
property did convey limited external competence in these areas. For example, counterfeit
goods fall under external EU competence but other aspects of intellectual property rights are
subject to concurrent competence. However, the Amsterdam Treaty inserted a new provision
(Article 133 (5)) that exclusive EU competence could be extended to services and intellectual
property subject to consultation with the European Parliament and a unanimous decision in
the Council. In the absence of such an agreement it is likely that Union competence will
increase as more “internal rules” are adopted in these areas (sometimes by qualified majority
voting).
The GATS was the first multilateral agreement on trade in services. However, whilst bringing
some extra discipline to the area of trade in services it is generally accepted that this first step
towards multilateral liberalisation did not generate substantial market opening (Hoekman
(1995)). The agreement did however, start a process by which effective liberalisation may be
provided in future negotiations. The contracting parties accepted two key sets of obligations
under the GATS. Firstly, a set of general concepts and rules, of which unconditional MFN
treatment is the principal obligation, which apply to measures affecting trade in all service
sectors, except those explicitly mentioned in the Annex to the agreement (the ‘negative list’).
In principle, the exemptions may not last longer than ten years, and will be subject to
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negotiation in future rounds. Secondly, there are specific commitments on market access and
national treatment regarding listed sectors and sub-sectors (the ‘positive list’), although
particular qualifications, limitations and conditions can be maintained for each of the itemised
sectors and sub-sectors. It is obstacles to market access which are prohibited with the
following six measures being explicitly identified: limitations on the number of suppliers;
ceilings on the value of transactions or assets; restrictions on output; limitations on
employment or on the number of persons supplying a service; constraints on the type of legal
entity via which a service is provided; and ceilings on foreign share holdings or on the value
of foreign investment.
It is very difficult to ascertain the extent and magnitude of trade barriers in services and the
extent to which these will be alleviated by the GATS. There is however, little doubt that for
many service products constraints on trade remain considerable. Analysis of the commitments
made under the GATS suggests that in many service sectors substantial violations of national
treatment and significant restrictions on market access remain. Hoekman and Primo Braga
(1997) calculate that commitments made by high-income countries represent just under half
of the total commitments that could have been made. Of these commitments only one quarter
entail the removal of all restrictions on market access and national treatment. The degree of
liberalisation by low-income countries is substantially less. One important feature of the
GATS is the commitment to progressive liberalisation in the form of ‘successive rounds of
negotiations’ to reduce barriers to trade in services and provide effective market access.
The first set of mandated negotiations commenced in 2000. There are a number of reasons
why the EU will be keen to achieve a successful outcome form these negotiations. The
continued presence of substantial barriers to trade in services together with low tariffs and
non-tariff barriers on industrial products, leads to the possibility that effective rates of
protection for these industrial goods may be negative if the prices of intermediate service
inputs are substantially higher than world market prices. Thus, pressure from manufacturing
industries for low cost service inputs to enhance ability to compete on international markets is
likely to keep the issue of services trade liberalisation high on the EU agenda. In addition, the
EU perceives that in certain service sectors, such as financial services and
telecommunications services, EU countries have a comparative advantage, which has been
enhanced by the liberalisation of internal EU trade. Thus, standard mercantilist concerns will
generate pressures for increasing access to overseas markets.THE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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The issue of services also arises in EU bilateral free trade agreements, although coverage and
the extent of liberalisation vary greatly across the different agreements. Similar to the rules
governing preferential trade in goods, the GATS (Art. V) requires that bilateral trade
agreements have ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ and that they eliminate ‘substantially all
discrimination’. The GATS also requires that overall barriers to services trade of countries not
included in the preferential agreement should not rise for each sector and sub-sector.
Liberalisation tends to be much deeper in agreements with countries who are prospective
members of the EU, such as the Central and Eastern European countries, although the recent
agreement with Mexico offers the prospect of far reaching liberalisation. Within three years of
this agreement entering into force a joint council ‘shall adopt a decision providing for the
elimination of substantially all remaining discrimination in the sectors and modes of supply
covered’. Nevertheless, this decision can be delayed until after the mandated negotiations at
the WTO for further multilateral liberalisation under the GATS. In contrast the agreements
with Tunisia and South Africa, for example, contain little substance on services and rights of
establishment beyond a restatement of existing commitments under the GATS.
Conclusions: The Future of EU External Commercial Policies
EU trade policies will continue to be determined by different and sometimes conflicting
factors. Here we try and identify the key issues and influences and how they vary according to
relations with different regions of the world. Thus, in relations with North America and Asia
the strong influence of large corporate interests will push forward an agenda on removing
regulatory barriers to trade.
In Europe strategic and foreign policy concerns are paramount. The key remaining
commercial policy dilemmas facing the EU are in its relations with countries in the Balkans
and with the European CIS countries. Their location and the similarities of their industrial and
trade structures with the acceding countries in Central and Eastern Europe, mean that these
countries are likely to be economically affected by the next enlargement of the EU.
15 Given
their political instability and geopolitical importance, they will be  priority cases in terms of
EU foreign policy. However, the implementation of the standard EU foreign policy response
of a free trade area is complicated in these countries by problems of judicial and
                                                       
15 For example, a very large proportion of Moldovan exports to the EU comprises apple juice. Poland
is also a major producer of apple juice. After accession Polish producers will enjoy a more than 20 per
cent margin of preference in the EU market relative to Moldovan producers. It is most likely that the
accession of Poland will lead to trade diversion away from Moldovan producers.PAUL BRENTON
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administrative capacity to implement the increasingly onerous obligations that the EU seeks
in such agreements. The EU will also have to offer unprecedented access in agricultural
products if FTAs with these countries are to be consistent with the accepted requirements of
the WTO and substantial trade diversion for certain agricultural products from the next
enlargement is to be avoided.
In North Africa and the Mediterranean region trade relations will be determined by the extent
to which free trade agreements, such as those with Tunisia and Morocco, can be implemented
with other countries in the region. Again, this area is important from the foreign policy
context of the EU. Trade relations with African and Caribbean countries will continue to be
determined in a development context with energies over the next ten years being concentrated
upon implementing a system of reciprocal bilateral free trade agreements as envisaged under
the new Lomé agreement. In both of these cases the hegemonic role of the EU is a dominant
factor.
The sphere of influence of the EU is weaker in Latin America and there is little possibility of
the EU negotiating free trade agreements which exclude sensitive agricultural products from
tariff liberalisation. Thus, the extension of EU preferential treatment into Central and South
America will be constrained by the extent to which the CAP is further reformed. Reform of
the CAP is also a crucial issue with regard to further multilateral trade negotiations. Without
genuine market opening by the EU for key agricultural products, such as beef, milk products
and cereals, there is little prospect of success in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva on
agricultural trade liberalisation or in a wider trade round if that were to be launched.
Trade relations with North America and Asia will reflect the growing importance of large
corporate interests in pushing forward their agenda on trade facilitation. The process with the
US and Canada is much more advanced as reflected by the mutual recognition agreements. In
addition formal relations are clearly defined on a bilateral basis with these countries and the
TABD has proved to be effective in influencing policy priorities. With regard to Asia the
principal forum with the EU is the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in which dialogue takes
place between the EU and seven members of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) together with China, South Korea and Japan.
Again, corporate interests are involved via the Asia Europe Business Forum but progress on
addressing technical and other regulatory barriers to trade is likely to be much slower than in
transatlantic relations.THE CHANGING DETERMINANTS OF EU TRADE POLICIES
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Thus, EU trade policy is becoming increasingly diverse whilst covering a broader range of
issues and a wider set of bilateral relations. The forces framing trade policies are varied and
different frameworks are evolving for different issues and for trade with different regions and
countries. Given the absolute magnitude of the trade flows involved, increasing importance is
being given to transatlantic relations and the removal of technical barriers to trade, which are
of particular interest to large multinational corporations seeking to most efficiently operate
global networks of production facilities.
The trend towards ever increasing flows of foreign direct investment suggests that the role of
multinationals in influencing trade policy developments will continue to be enhanced. This is
leading to a trade policy process which is necessarily bilateral and often discriminatory and
one which is selective in terms of product and sector coverage. These are issues which have
typically been of concern to the WTO in assessing the impact of preferential trade agreements
on third countries. Given the current lack of clear WTO disciplines in preferential trade
facilitation it is important that the EU consider carefully the impact of this trend in bilateral
trade policies on trade in general. This requires an assessment not just of the implications for
current trade flows but whether such agreements may affect the ability of developing
countries to enter the markets for particular goods as they climb the ladder of technical
sophistication in the array of goods that they produce.PAUL BRENTON
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Table 1 The Structure of Extra-EU Imports of Industrial Products and Import Tariffs




Share of Imports with t=0 Share of Imports with t>10
ECU 000 1997 2005 1997 2005 1997 2005
Pharmaceuticals 7870030 1.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
Inorganic, Organic Chemicals and Fertilizers 23647614 5.13 5.41 4.44 21.95 25.77 7.82 0.02
Other Chemicals 13476458 2.93 5.80 4.66 2.30 23.17 1.88 0.11
Plastics 19214501 4.17 6.63 5.12 11.93 12.90 25.74 0.00
Raw Hides and Skins 3177045 0.69 1.83 1.69 58.10 58.14 0.00 0.00
Wood 10955426 2.38 2.14 1.41 51.06 73.28 0.00 0.00
Wood Pulp 11935585 2.59 3.18 0.00 46.34 49.44 0.00 0.00
Textiles 15839614 3.44 6.32 4.85 21.34 22.59 20.93 0.04
Clothing 39105933 8.49 12.76 11.62 0.18 0.18 94.18 92.41
Footwear etc 8299742 1.80 9.62 8.93 0.22 0.22 28.62 28.62
Stone, Cement etc 2801607 0.61 4.96 4.11 2.38 20.78 11.20 11.20
Iron and Steel 16492414 3.58 3.56 1.37 9.54 55.88 0.00 0.00
Base Metals 23273435 5.05 3.65 3.24 34.26 36.15 1.80 0.00
Non-electrical Machinery 94852731 20.59 2.61 1.51 7.12 38.79 0.01 0.00
Electrical Machinery 75789835 16.45 5.06 4.07 1.33 13.90 7.64 6.49
Motor Vehicles 30414253 6.60 8.47 7.97 0.00 2.56 8.15 3.13
Other Transport Equipment 18655524 4.05 0.59 0.43 82.24 82.87 0.01 0.00
Precision Instruments 27421251 5.95 3.90 2.60 5.34 30.27 0.00 0.00
Miscellaneous Manufactures 17489947 3.80 3.73 2.02 0.34 42.14 0.34 0.00
Total Industrial Products 460712945 5.01 3.93 12.69 29.62 12.73 9.7135





Share of Imports with t=0 Share of Imports with t>10
ECU 000 1997 2005 1997 2005 1997 2005
Pharmaceuticals 3261537 2,95 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
Inorganic, Organic Chemicals and Fertilizers 6283667 5,68 4.84 4.12 28.43 31.47 4.87 0.05
Other Chemicals 5568076 5,03 5.38 4.27 1.82 28.23 0.86 0.15
Plastics 4996221 4,52 7.01 5.28 12.11 13.80 32.14 0.00
Raw Hides and Skins 379122 0,34 2.79 2.33 39.37 43.87 2.38 0.00
Wood 1542466 1,39 2.14 1.58 56.05 69.63 0.00 0.00
Wood Pulp 3539149 3,20 2.41 0.00 55.96 60.78 0.00 0.00
Textiles 1439430 1,30 6.94 5.43 8.92 8.94 19.36 0.01
Clothing 783375 0,71 11.54 10.45 3.92 3.92 81.22 73.18
Footwear etc 152855 0,14 7.56 6.98 0.51 0.51 10.62 10.62
Stone, Cement etc 920772 0,83 4.37 3.47 1.15 19.13 2.90 2.90
Iron and Steel 1416315 1,28 3.92 1.94 4.67 38.99 0.00 0.00
Base Metals 2533101 2,29 4.61 3.98 9.28 12.72 0.40 0.00
Non-electrical Machinery 33273890 30,08 2.39 1.49 15.79 38.27 0.00 0.00
Electrical Machinery 18415024 16,65 4.28 3.20 2.67 18.74 1.21 0.76
Motor Vehicles 4694891 4,24 7.22 6.35 0.00 8.48 3.15 2.73
Other Transport Equipment 9031319 8,17 0.86 0.65 75.69 75.89 0.02 0.00
Precision Instruments 10770911 9,74 3.24 1.62 7.83 47.98 0.00 0.00
Miscellaneous Manufactures 1604603 1,45 3.44 1.88 2.88 36.68 0.06 0.00
Total Industrial Products 1,11E+08 3.53 2.50 17.57 37.33 2.99 0.8136










ECU 000 1997 2005 1997 2005 1997 2005
Pharmaceuticals 89876 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
Inorganic, Organic Chemicals
and Fertilizers
1238287 3.55 5.44 4.66 19.42 21.30 6.00 0.00
Other Chemicals 504081 1.44 5.40 4.48 7.41 22.66 0.92 0.13
Plastics 1508003 4.32 6.91 6.09 1.56 2.05 4.08 0.00
Raw Hides and Skins 2523980 7.23 5.40 4.51 0.49 1.03 13.83 0.00
Wood 449594 1.29 3.31 1.72 0.89 53.52 0.00 0.00
Wood Pulp 281929 0.81 6.15 0.00 19.88 20.73 0.00 0.00
Textiles 1058811 3.03 6.20 4.92 20.40 29.12 22.99 0.00
Clothing 5639833 16.15 12.56 11.49 0.02 0.02 90.20 89.88
Footwear etc 2142287 6.13 10.09 9.14 0.55 0.55 34.49 34.49
Stone, Cement etc 503909 1.44 6.45 5.61 1.70 7.19 17.28 17.28
Iron and Steel 987910 2.83 4.02 2.81 0.12 9.63 0.00 0.00
Base Metals 1116828 3.20 5.00 3.84 13.03 16.05 16.75 0.00
Non-electrical Machinery 3440671 9.85 2.80 1.39 3.62 58.28 0.06 0.00
Electrical Machinery 6129641 17.55 5.43 4.36 3.86 12.88 16.48 12.90
Motor Vehicles 217889 0.62 4.87 3.81 0.00 1.32 0.57 0.51
Other Transport Equipment 148468 0.43 0.36 0.27 88.96 89.79 0.00 0.00
Precision Instruments 1872625 5.36 4.87 3.93 0.36 6.44 0.00 0.00
Miscellaneous Manufactures 5070191 14.52 4.57 2.97 0.00 24.13 0.41 0.00
Total Industrial Products 34924813 6.44 5.26 3.60 16.41 22.53 19.1537
Table 4 The Importance of Industrial Products & Technical Regulations in EU Trade
Share of Industrial Products Share of Products Subject to EU
Technical Regulations
EU Imports EU Exports EU Imports EU Exports
INTRA-EUR15 85,54 86,10 70,77 71,30
EXTRA-EUR15 80,66 90,86 60,77 77,29
EFTA (4) 77,23 90,55 65,07 68,71
SWITZERLAND 96,86 89,93 45,84 72,71
ACP (70) 40,21 82,29 67,46 68,85
TURKEY 83,62 95,24 65,75 78,09
CEEC10 91,25 92,26 58,02 72,55
Balkans 91,16 84,77 39,50 70,63
CIS 57,19 81,62 52,98 71,10
MED 41,60 85,57 61,56 72,74
SOUTH AFRICA 68,28 94,58 33,20 77,56
UNITED STATES 92,29 93,09 71,64 79,48
CANADA 78,01 89,92 61,13 80,48
MEXICO 71,93 94,51 65,63 79,29
CACM 21,48 91,24 9,26 87,69
Andean 24,71 89,67 28,59 81,50
Mercosur 38,83 93,63 37,74 79,36
CHILE 62,60 95,44 22,13 74,86
Indian SC 88,10 96,05 54,66 82,64
New Nics 85,68 94,41 42,95 85,91
CHINA 94,88 96,18 46,92 85,12
NICS 99,02 94,05 53,64 78,75
JAPAN 99,70 87,39 75,90 69,91
ASNZ 56,29 94,78 41,84 81,1638
Table 5. Share of Trade in Products Covered by EU-US MRA and by All New
Approach Directives
Products under US-EU MRA except
GMP
Products under US-EU MRA except
GMP
All products under NA All products under NA
EU Imports EU Exports EU Imports EU Exports
TURKEY 1.50 TURKEY 5.43 TURKEY 2.66 TURKEY 15.67
POLAND 3.38 POLAND 5.89 POLAND 5.21 POLAND 14.14
CZECH REP. 7.00 CZECH REP. 8.01 CZECH REP. 11.04 CZECH REP. 14.17
SLOVAKIA 2.73 SLOVAKIA 8.35 SLOVAKIA 5.01 SLOVAKIA 14.57
HUNGARY 6.11 HUNGARY 8.06 HUNGARY 7.72 HUNGARY 12.72
ROMANIA 0.77 ROMANIA 5.63 ROMANIA 2.04 ROMANIA 14.68
BULGARIA 1.53 BULGARIA 4.52 BULGARIA 2.86 BULGARIA 9.73
UKRAINE 0.27 UKRAINE 4.89 UKRAINE 0.69 UKRAINE 11.29
RUSSIA 0.16 RUSSIA 7.72 RUSSIA 0.36 RUSSIA 14.11
US 12.62 US 6.88 US 15.71 US 12.08
CANADA 5.68 CANADA 4.48 CANADA 8.10 CANADA 10.61
S.KOREA 14.22 S.KOREA 6.23 S.KOREA 15.37 S.KOREA 15.62
JAPAN 9.99 JAPAN 6.80 JAPAN 15.06 JAPAN 11.13
TAIWAN 17.74 TAIWAN 10.47 TAIWAN 20.76 TAIWAN 18.69
INTEU12 5.15 INTEU12 5.62 INTEU12 7.76 INTEU12 8.53
EXTEU12 7.45 EXTEU12 6.84 EXTEU12 10.03 EXTEU12 12.8039
Figure 1. The Geographical Structure of EU15 Imports, 1965-199840
Figure 2. The Geographical Structure of EU15 Exports, 1965-199841
Figure 3. The Commodity Structure of EU15 Imports, 1965 and 199842
Figure 4. The Commodity Structure of EU15 Exports, 1965 and 199843
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, United States
• Old MED
• Old Lomé Convention
• Balkans: Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia
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• Israel, Mexico, South Africa
• New MED: Morocco, Tunisia
• New MED (under negotiation): Algeria,







Notes: 1. The Data for 1965 do not include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 2. The data for the Balkans includes data for Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), but all trade
preferences are currently suspended. 3. The data for 1965 include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 4. The EU  has signed an MRA with the US and is negotiating similar agreements





















Figure 5. The Structure of EU Preferential Agreements
(with share of EU15 imports in 1965 and 1998)